Showing posts with label memes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label memes. Show all posts

17 May 2016

G. C. Williams and confusion about information

Here's the intro:
"I have recently come across Georges C. Williams’ arguments for why genes and memes should be defined as information, in his 1992 book Natural Selection. I had seen quotes from Williams made by many proponents of the meme idea but had yet to see for myself how he argued that information is what genes and memes are made of. I found that Williams had a great insight into the true nature of replicators, maybe the most precise understanding that I have come across so far. However, I also believe that Williams made a slight but important mistake in his argumentation. The mistake is that Williams is confusing two very different understandings of the concept of information."

And here's the conclusion:
"I hope I have made it clear that information is an often misunderstood and a misused concept, particularly among memeticists. Information is best understood as a subjective experience that is confined to our minds (and computers’ “minds”) and does not travel into the outside world. The only thing that travels between brains are codes. Codes can be said to be informative for they have a potential to cause meaning. Codes can be transcoded into other codes and form long codical chains of trancodes. However, these transcodes are not to be considered equal in the eyes of evolution as they compete for survival. The codes that end up being truly copied, i.e. with the same medium and the same recognisable pattern, are the replicators. Replicators are typically found to be among codes exchanged between interactors. Information theory can be useful for memeticists because it studies some of the codes’ properties."

Html version here
PDF version here

27 April 2015

Redefining the meme and the replicator

These are the ideas I have presented during the last memelab.
I tried my best to condense and communicate my vision of memetics. I propose a new definition of both the replicator and the meme in the hope to make memetics a more testable and falsifiable science. I would love to hear your comments.

PDF version here
Html version here
Version en Français ici

6 November 2014

Memelab Autumn 2014

So I had the pleasure of joining the latest session of Susan Blackmore's Memelab which took place on the first and second of November 2014.

It was a fun, inspirational and enlightening experience. The idea of the Memelab is very simple. It is a rather informal gathering of people interested in discussing the subject of memetics. There were seven of us this time, coming from various backgrounds and different parts of the world. The only rule to this event was a schedule planned so that each participant had a chance to lead the discussion one way or another for an hour. 

This time, Memelab took place in Bristol:


Alan Winfield hosted this session in his own house and made everyone feel at home. It made for a charming weekend indeed.

We discussed many subjects during this session. Here are a few I can remember:
  • Martin was interested in understanding how advertising fatigue may occur and if we develop some kind of immunity to memes in advertising.
  • Rachel wanted to explore how simple drawings get affected by successive hand copying.
  • Susan, was asking what should be done to inform the world about the fast approaching reign of technology.
  • Alan introduced his work on ethical robots.
  • Andrew introduced us to his PHD work on memetics and religion.
  • And myself I tried to emphasise the fact that we find it hard, still today, to define memes.

I enormously enjoyed this event and very much look forward to renewing this experience.

Here is the list of participants:

Susan Blackmore


Alan Winfield


Martin Farncombe


Rachel Cohen



Andrew Atkinson


Marina Strinkovsky


Sylvain Magne




2 April 2013

Copy or not copy ?

Next important concept to clarify: the copy.
It seems straightforward, but still, one needs to define it well in order to minimise misunderstandings. Here's my attempt at defining the copy based on the previous definitions.
Again, your comments are most welcome.
You can also view the article below with this link : The Copy
Or go back to the contents list : Contents

The copy
Copy or not copy?
By Sylvain Magne
Now that we have shown that everything is code, the question ensues: what makes a particular code a replicator? What sets a replicating code apart from other codes?
In the world of codes there are all sorts of codes that have for effect to change the world in all sorts of different ways. That’s what particles do when they interact with one-another, they keep transforming the universe by attracting each-other, repulsing each-other, bouncing, breaking, merging, spinning, etc. Of all the possible interactions in the world, some may lead to remarkable outcomes. It is the case of the replicator. The particular effect of replicators is that their interaction with a reader leads to the creation of a copy of the original code. Consequently, the next question that needs answering is:
  1. What is a copy?

I have found that such a simple word is not as clearly defined as one may think. Just like we did with the “entity”, we need to define the “copy” more precisely in order to make more sense of the concept of replicator. As I was looking for definitions of “copy”I stumbled upon one that I particularly liked, and that is Google’s definition of a copy . I liked it for its clarity and simplicity, so let’s start with that. Google defines the copy as :
A thing made to be similar or identical to another.
I like this definition because it is very large and encompassing and yet very simple, very much like Richard Dawkins’ definition of the replicator. Only Richard Dawkins may have used the word “entity” instead of “thing”.
There are three elements to be considered here. First there is the copy, here referred as the “thing”. Then there is the original code, here referred as “another” thing. And finally there is a copy maker responsible for the “made to be similar or identical” part. Again this definition seems very straightforward, but we need to understand clearly what each of these elements mean.
  1. What’s that thing?

According to the code centered view of the world that we chose in the previous chapter, the “thing” ( which is equivalent to Richard Dawkins’ “entity” ) is necessarily a code, simply because anything can be regarded as a code, and that is true for the original thing too. So what we are talking about here are copies of codes.
  1. Where is the copy maker?

If any copy is to be made, it needs to be made by a device that can perform actions. Again, as we have seen before, if we have codes we necessarily have readers, and readers can indeed perform actions. Therefore, the copies will necessarily be made by a reader. In other words, anything that makes copies of some code is a reader. For example, in genetics the copy maker is the human body copying genes. In computer science the copy maker is the computer copying programmes. In the printing industry the copy maker is a photocopier copying pages of text and images. In the world of art the copy maker is a painter copying paintings. And so on .. This means that cells, computers, people and photocopiers are all readers.
Just like for any code, the very existence of a copy implies the existence of a reader capable of making copies.
  1. Made to be.
Note how the definition says “made to be similar or identical” and not just “similar and identical”. This implies that things that just “happen to be” similar or identical will not qualify as copies. This point is crucial. For example, two identical molecules in the universe that happen to be the same are not necessarily copies of each other. So what is the difference between something that happens to be similar and something that is made to be similar?
The difference lies in the fact that the original code needs to have been fully involved in shaping the copy. To the point where if any part of the original is missing, the copy will fail. Quite simply, the only way to make a copy with certainty is to make it by letting the original code guide you through the copying process. The reader making the copy needs to read the entire code if it is to copy it faithfully. All the aspects of the copied code will be influenced by the original code and nothing can be left to chance in the copying process because if any part is left to chance, that part fails to be a copy, except maybe if by chance it is similar.

This said. How perfect does a copy need to be exactly? And what would it mean for a copy to be perfect?
  1. Similar or identical?

Now, as memeticists, we have a problem with the mentioning of “similar” versus “identical”. It seems fair that the definition says “similar or identical” because we are used to seeing imperfect copies around us and still consider them as copies. Unfortunately, we may not enjoy such flexibility when talking about replicators. Indeed, Richard Dawkins has explained clearly why, when talking about replicators, the copy needs to be identical. There are two simple reasons for why replicators need to be identical :
  1. First, in the case of genes, if one single bit of a gene changes it can cause the gene to have a dramatic effect on its host, possibly deleterious. Therefore loosely copying genes is not a good idea.
  2. Second, genes compete with each other for a chance to survive. On the rare occasions when a gene mutates, this new mutated gene enters the arena, the gene pool, as a new contender which could eventually replace the original gene. The original gene and its new mutated versions become instantly alleles and therefore compete for the same spot in the gene pool. Therefore the new mutated gene cannot be considered as a copy of the original for the fact that it competes with the original.
That is why one single alteration in a gene makes this gene a failed copy, and that is why the copying process needs to be perfect. Not only that but that logic applies to all replicators. Indeed if a replicator, whatever its nature is copied loosely, the new failed copy becomes a new contender and cannot be considered a copy. Therefore we find ourselves with the necessary following rule:
  • The copy needs to be identical to the original code.
Now the question is: can memes actually comply with this and be perfectly copied?
Meme fidelity is a big issue. This is one of the major challenges that memetics is facing since the very beginning, and is still unresolved today. I hope to show here how we could solve this puzzle. From our daily experience we can see for ourselves that a lot of the ideas and cultural traits around us don’t get copied very well and yet seem to spread somehow. Can we create a meme theory that accounts for this loose copying process or do we need to change the way we understand memes? If replicators are meant to be perfectly copied, is a meme theory even conceivable?
The point I am going to make here is simple. I want to show that perfect copying is relative and that, taken from the right point of view, a seemingly lose copying process can appear as a perfectly accurate process, consequently re-establishing the concept of replicator as a valid model for memetics. The solution I am offering lies in a particular branch of mathematics, fuzzy logic.
  1. Fuzzy Logic is not fussy.

Fuzzy logic is interesting to memetics because it gives us a tool to deal with the fact that the world is not perfect. Fuzzy logic and probabilistic logic are crucial to the world of codes and mathematics. Fuzzy logic is no less rigorous than traditional mathematics, it is entirely part of mathematics, with its own set of laws. Fuzzy logic is a tool which accepts that data and calculations can be imprecise, incomplete or mixed up. The world we live in is very much like that indeed. On one hand there are things that we can count in a very binary fashion, like the number of apples on a tree for example, and on the other hand, we sometimes need to measure approximately quantities such as the weight of apples. Unfortunately, where you might be able to give a precise count of the number of apples, there is no device in the world that can give you the exact weight of an apple, simply because any instrument used has a limited precision.
To be fair, even counting apples on a tree is not that straightforward. What do you make of apples that are half eaten by worms or apples that are not fully grown or apples that are rotten? As a matter of fact there is no counting or measuring in this world that can be done perfectly. Even at the level of elementary particles where quantum physics take over.
For any measurement that we make we need to accept a certain level of uncertainty, of fuzziness. Scientists are fully aware of that fact and have to deal with it constantly. Scientists work really hard to measure and reduce the fuzziness of their objects of study in order to gather reliable data. The consequence of this fact is that, if it is impossible to measure something perfectly, then you cannot determine perfect copies. My point here is that a perfect true copy, a replicate, cannot actually exist. No matter how precise your tools are you cannot create an absolute replicate. Ultimately, even if you copy an object atom by atom, as genes do, quantum physics will not allow for the copy to be exactly the same simply because the atoms will move differently in both the original gene and the copy.
So, if there is no such thing as a replicate, what are we to make of the concept of replicator itself? Can replicators actually exist at all?
Well, as a matter of fact, this fuzziness of the world doesn’t stop us from counting apples and hasn’t stopped us from building computers. Somehow our brains can still count apples and our computers can still count bits. How does that work?
It works because, although there is fuzziness, there are also ways of reducing fuzziness, or simply ignoring it. Our brains and our computers can tolerate a degree of uncertainty. If you are a farmer and you are picking the best apples to sell on the market, your brain will look for features and characteristics in the apples that will allow for certain apples to be selected and others not. The brain will define a threshold between green, yellow and red for example and apply that threshold in order to pick the apples with the right colour. A computer will do the same. Within computer chips there are loose electrons that can add background noise to the data. To avoid the noise disturbing the reading of the data, computers have a threshold that will allow for slight fluctuations in the signal and, as long as those fluctuations aren’t too extreme, the signal can be read perfectly despite the background noise.
Thus, despite the fuzziness of the world, our fuzzy-ready brains manage to make sense of it. Similarly, despite the agitation of particles at the gene level, genes still manage to stick together. This tolerance to fuzziness is what allow genetic codes and computer codes to be copied in a way that can be considered “good enough”. The copies are not exact in the absolute, that is a fact, but within the range of tolerance of the gene machines and computers, these copies can still be regarded as identical.
What does fuzzy logic tells us?
  • Fuzzy logic tells us that even though there is no absolute copy that can exist, perfect copies can still exist in a relativistic point of view.
Now what is that point of view exactly and what does it take for a copy to be regarded as good enough?
  1. The reader’s point of view.

The replicator is tied to the concept of copy because a replicator simply has to get copied to be a replicator. Not only does it need to be copied, but it needs to be copied well enough. Now who or what decides what is a good enough copy? How can we determine whether a copy is successfully created as such?
For example, how will you determine if a copy of your front door key is a good copy? Well, you will simply try it on your door and see if it opens the door. It seems obvious to say that it doesn’t matter if your key doesn’t open other doors. The only point of view that matters is whether it opens your door and is compatible with the keyhole in yourdoor. Furthermore, the copy doesn’t need to be perfect in every aspect. If your original key is made of iron, but you used copper to create the copy, the key will still work. It won’t matter whether the key is made of iron or copper, or whether it is blue or red. The only thing that matters is for the key to have the right shape and to be strong enough to open the door it is meant to open. This idea can be generalised to any kind of copy. Copies only need to work from a certain point of view which is their reader’s point of view. A Macintosh computer is not fit to say if a PC programme is copied well. Similarly, a camera is not fit to decide if a sound wave is correct. A reader that is fit to make such judgement is a reader that is compatible with the code that we want to evaluate. In the same way that a human gene is evaluated inside a human body and a computer programme is evaluated by compatible computers, all codes and copies need to be evaluated by their compatible readers.
So the best way to determine if a copy is a good copy indeed is to use the right reader. To test the quality of a copy, you simply need to run it through the reader. If when running it through the reader the copy reads just like the original, then the copy is a true copy. Running the original code or running the copied code should result in indistinguishable outcomes. But again, only from the point of view of the reader. That is precisely what a computer does when making copies. It verifies the copy by reading it through the same process as the original and checks if it reads the same way.
As a result:
  • The only meaningful point of view to judge the quality of a replicator is the point of view of its reader.
  • From the point of view of the reader, true copies and replicators can exist.
This is how the concept of copy and replicator need to be understood, if they are to make sense. They need to be understood in a relativistic manner. The quality of codes as replicators is defined by their relationship with their readers. If from the reader’s point of view a specific code is seeing itself successfully copied over and over then it deserves to be labeled a replicator. Judging it from a different point of view could be misleading. You may think that two keys are different because they are coloured differently when in reality they can be regarded as identical from the viewpoint of doors and keyholes.
Therefore there is hope for replicators to exist. If we take the right point of view, we can hope to find true copies of genes, of computer programmes and cultural traits. And that is the very reason why the replicator idea may still work for memetics.
  1. Analog, Digital and Timescales.

Note that the example of the key is not a perfect example because of the way copies of keys are made. After several successive copies of a key, errors will eventually accumulate and the shape of the key will eventually fluctuate. Maybe, after five or ten copies the latest copy may actually fail to open the door. The reason is that the information stored on the key is analog and not digital. The problem with analog codes is that, unlike digital codes, there is no noise reduction system that can allow for the code to be copied perfectly. Analog codes have no inbuilt tolerance for variations like digital codes have. Digital codes are digital in the sense that they are broken down into smaller bits that can be stored and deciphered easily, so that even if the data suffers slight variations, the shape of the bit remains readable. When copying digital codes, we don’t copy every details of the medium carrying the code but we only need to copy the sequence of bits and reproduce that sequence faithfully. This reduces the amount of information needed to make the copy because one can ignore the imperfections of the medium. In the case of analog codes there are no bits that are easily recognisable and therefore every minute aspect of the medium becomes relevant and needs to be copied in order to preserve the code. The problem is that the amount of information needed to copy that code is actually enormous and makes it impossible to be copied exactly. Consequently every copy will suffer some amount of data loss.
An analog code is therefore doomed to fail eventually. What kind of replicator would that be then? This problem is true for all analog recordings and this important point will need to be addressed when redefining the memes. The question this raises is whether memes have an analog nature or a digital nature and how this impacts their replicating abilities. If analog codes are doomed to fail then can they be considered as replicators? In the case of keys, one can’t deny that there is a potential series of copies that will live on for a while. If one considers replicators over a short length of time, then there may be some codes that qualify, but then when considering a larger length of time those codes may not really qualify as replicators if their survival is too short to be significant.
What I am trying to say here is that the nature of a replicator depends on the timescale one may consider. There will be more codes that can qualify as replicators on a short length of time than on a longer one. Simply because codes that can live longer will tend to be more rare. These aspects of evolution can be witnessed in biology. Depending on the timescale, the length of the bits of dna that qualify as replicators will tend to be longer for short periods of time and shorter for long periods of time. The reason is simple, and that is because of the way genes are shuffled in the genepool through sexual reproduction. The more generations of offsprings the higher the chances that a gene may be cut in half and therefore fail to be passed on in its entirety.
Realistically, one can expect replicators of digital nature to be favored by natural selection over analog ones. Also, one can expect that fact to be true for memes as well. Analog memes would tend to be short lived and may not really qualify as replicators. Let’s just hope that memes are more digital than analog if we hope to apply the theory of evolution to culture.
  1. Conclusion.

To sum things up, let's give ourselves our own definition of a copy. It could go like this :
  • A copy is a code made to be identical to an original code, by and from the relative point of view of a reader.
With these new definitions of the terms “entity” and “copy”, we now find ourselves with a new relativistic and more precise definition of the replicator. I believe this definition is compatible with the gene theory and can help opening the doors to a science of memetics and also defining better what Susan blackmore calls temes. We may find that this new definition of the replicator could change not only our perception of memes but could also change somewhat our understanding of genes as well.
Let’s dive into these questions with the next chapter : The new replicators (link coming soon)






30 November 2010

Comments on Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson's article

 I wish to make comments on Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson's article:
“Memes: Universal acid or better mousetrap.”
Published in the following book :
Darwinizing Culture.
The status of memetics as a science.
Edited by Robert Aunger.
Foreword by Daniel Dennett.
With contributions from:
Robert Aunger, Susan Blackmore, Maurice Bloch, Robert Boyd, Rosaria Conte, David L.Hull, Adam Kuper, Kevin Laland, John Odling-Smee, Henry Plotkin, Peter J. Richerson, Dan Sperber.


In this instance, once again I would like to show how Boyd and Richerson misunderstand the very concept of replicator, and consequently offer a critique of memetics which is not as constructive as it could have been. 
Furthermore, I want to challenge Boyd and Richerson suggestion that population thinking is a better way to looking at cultural evolution.

1/
Boyd and Richerson first introduce replicators as “material objects that are faithfully copied”. It certainly isn't Richard Dawkin's view who described replicators as “any entity in the universe of which copies are made”. Indeed an “entity” is not necessarily a “material object” and by limiting their horizon of possibilities, Boyd and Richerson limit their own understanding of memetics. We will see later how this leads to confusion.

Further down in the article Boyd and Richerson make another mistake about replicators and write:

In The Extended Phenotype, Richard Dawkins (1982) argues that the cumulative evolution of complex adaptations requires what he calls replicators, things in the physical world that produce copies of themselves, and have the three additional properties:

  1. Fidelity. The copying must be sufficiently accurate so that even after a long chain of copies the replicator remains almost unchanged.
  2. Fecundity. At least some varieties of the replicator must be capable of generating more than one copy of themselves.
  3. Longevity. Replicators must survive long enough to affect their own rate of replication.


From reading this it appears that Boyd and Richerson didn't understand Richard Dawkin's definitions.
First of all, fidelity means that replicators remain unchanged and not “almost” unchanged. A replicator that changes is not a replicator. If an instance of a replicator mutates then it is a whole new potential replicator that appears. This new replicator is instantly in competition for survival against the very replicator from which it originated. Richard's point about fidelity is that it needs to be not 100% perfect so as to allow mutations to happen, new replicators to appear, and evolution to occur by selecting the best replicators.

Secondly, technically, all replicators do not need to generate more than one copy of themselves. What Richard meant to say is that the higher the fecundity the higher the chances of survival. In other words, natural selection will usually (but not always) favour higher fecundity.

Finally, replicators obviously live long enough to affect their own replication rate otherwise they wouldn't replicate at all! Again, what Richard meant here is that the longer a replicator lives the more chances it has to have an opportunity to get copied.  

It is very unfortunate that Boyd and Richerson misrepresent Richard's ideas in such a way. Because of this misunderstanding they then criticise memetics for the wrong reasons.


2/
Now let's move on to Boyd and Richerson's argument in favour of population thinking. They write:

In this chapter we want to convince you that population thinking, not natural selection, is the key to conceptualising culture in terms of material causes. This argument is based on three well-established facts.

  1. There is persistent cultural variation among human groups. Any explanation of human behaviour must account for how this variation arises and how it is maintained.
  2. Culture is information stored in the human brain's. Every human culture contains vast amounts of information. Important components of this information are stored in human brain.
  3. Culture is derived. The psychological mechanisms that allow culture to be transmitted arose in the course of hominid evolution. Culture is not simply a by-product of intelligence and social life.


They then develop each point in the following chapters.
In the first Chapter Boyd and Richerson advocate the group theory of evolution. Valid points  against this view of evolution have been made before and I am not going to repeat them here. All I want to say here is that however seductive and intuitive the group theory may seem it nevertheless lacks any strong theoretical model in the sense that in group theory no one knows what is being selected. I believe that group theory may be a convenient tool for studying some evolutionary patterns but gives no real explanation for how evolution occurs. Also, I don't think it will apply any better to cultural evolution than it does to biological evolution.

In the second chapter, Boyd and Richerson argue that the majority of culture is stored in our brains, rather than in artefacts for example. They also argue that culture is not stored in our genes, or in other words, that genes have very little role to play in the differences that we can see in different cultures. The points Boyd and Richerson make are very good I find. The only issue with this lies in the definition of culture. Indeed culture lacks a clear definition today and any attempt at studying it begs the question “what is culture?”. If we were to to transpose the idea of culture to genes, what would you call the “genetic culture”? Is it the genotype? Is it the phenotypes? Is it the living cells and bodies? Is it all of it? Or is the question irrelevant? 
In my view, if I may share it at this point, we should maybe forget about culture for a second and think about culture from a replicator point of view, where there are only two things: the replicator and its phenotype. In my view, which I argue in my articles, what's in our brains are only the phenotypes of the memes and the memes exist only momentarily through the various media that we use to communicate them, such as light waves, sound waves, etc. If you want to know more, visit my online articles :


In the third chapter, Boyd and Richerson introduce the concept of local enhancement. They explain how a mother monkey can take its baby monkey to places where the baby monkey will learn new tricks, not through looking at his mother, but through his own exploration. Therefore there is a kind of inherited behaviour linked to the habits of the parent without having children directly copying them.

I find it to be a very interesting point, but unfortunately, from the replicator's perspective there is no reason to see anything cultural here. There are no replicators involved in this process, Boyd and Richerson say it themselves, but the fact that they nonetheless consider this as being cultural material is, in my view, highly doubtful. If you consider local enhancement as being able to create any “cultural material” then suddenly an awful lot of biological behaviours become cultural too. Is the fact that salmon goes back to the place where it was born cultural? Is the fact that the next generations of plants grow in the same place cultural? There is just as much local enhancement here and yet you wouldn't call this cultural.
In my opinion, Boyd and Richerson are very confused about the nature of culture. They see culture where it is not, where biological processes are enough to explain the observed behaviours without needing to introduce a hypothetical culture.


Boyd and Richerson go on to try and show that there can be no replicators inside our brains because there is no way to prove that the way one brain learns a behaviour is the same as the way another brain learns it. I perfectly agree with their position here and they make their point very well. The problem here is though, that they conclude that culture may not need replicators to exist. All I want to say here is that the fact that memes are not in brains does not mean that memes don't exist. I go back to my own ideas here which are that memes are actually travelling on the media that we use to communicate, and that our cultural brain structures are the phenotypes of these memes.

Boyd and Richerson then go even further and attempt to give their “coup de grâce” to the meme idea. They try to show that the copying process is too weak to allow the existence of memes. For example, in the pronunciation of certain sounds, we never copy exactly the sound of our parents or others, we don't necessarily either find the average pronunciation, but we create our own version that fits best us and our environment. Therefore, according to them there is no replicator here but there is nonetheless a cultural transmission and evolution taking place.
The problem of the fidelity in the copying process of memes is a big and serious issue that they do well to bring up. Dan Sperber also points the finger at this problem in his own article.
I myself advocate that memetics suffers from a serious lack of definition and it comes down to  two central questions. These are the two questions that Richard Dawkins left unanswered for us in his own definition of the replicator:

A replicator may be defined as any entity in the universe of which copies are made.
( Richard Dawkins 1976 )

And the real questions that need answering are:
What is a copy ?
What is the entity being copied ?

That is the very reason why I offer my own definitions in my articles to try and be as precise and accurate in order to have meaningful tools to develop memetics. One of the key elements to defining a true copy is to define a reference, a point from which two entities can be compared. For this purpose I introduced the concept of reader. In my theory, the reader and the replicators are part of a necessary system, together with the environment. The concept of reader is nothing magical and is a rather simple idea which efficiently helps answering the questions of copying fidelity, and others. The concept of reader makes the concept of copy a relativistic concept instead of an absolute concept as it is usually understood. The definition of reader comes together with a better definition of the replicator.

I invite you to read my articles on the subject here :
http://memelogic.blogspot.ch/2012/10/a-new-meme-theory-introduction.html

As always, comments are very welcome.

18 October 2010

Comments on "An objection to the memetic approach of culture." by Dan Sperber

 I wish to try and make comments on Dan Sperber's article: 
“An objection to the memetic approach of culture”
Published in the following book :
Darwinizing Culture.
The status of memetics as a science.
Edited by Robert Aunger.
Foreword by Daniel Dennett.
With contributions from:
Robert Aunger, Susan Blackmore, Maurice Bloch, Robert Boyd, Rosaria Conte, David L.Hull, Adam Kuper, Kevin Laland, John Odling-Smee, Henry Plotkin, Peter J. Richerson, Dan Sperber.

There are three main points I want to comment on.
First, Dan Sperber's representation of Richard Dawkin's concept which I think is mistaken.
Second, Dan's critic of Richard's Chinese whispers argument.
Third, Dan's final argument against memetics of inference VS copying.

1/
Dan Sperber seems to misunderstand, or at least misrepresent, the concept of meme as Richard Dawkins introduced it.
Dan Sperber writes:

Richard Dawkins defines “memes” as cultural replicators propagated through imitation, undergoing a process of selection, and standing to be selected not because they benefit their human carriers, but because they benefit themselves.

Richard Dawkins indeed defined memes as replicators but he did not mean to say that they only benefit themselves in the way Dan implies it. They surely do benefit themselves but they may benefit their hosts as well, and there is nothing in the definition of a replicator that forbids it. Benefiting oneself is not exclusive of benefiting others. Furthermore, most replicators benefit themselves simply by benefiting their hosts, because it is the very best route for their replication process. In most cases it is in the replicator's interest to benefit the host and we can reasonably expect it to be the case with memes as well.

Dan then consequently says that memes are aggressive things such as chain-letters or he suggests that this view sees memes as invading and recruiting minds only to further their own propagation. Here Dan is using a language that is personifying the memes in a way that Richard Dawkins has always warned against. Memes (or genes) don't “invade” nor “recruit” they simply happen to be successful at being copied. Memes are not conscious and they don't have plans. Dan's choice of vocabulary is certainly not helping to get the right picture and is misrepresenting Dawkins' view.

2/
Dan Sperber then continues and reacts to one of the later arguments of Richard Dawkins where Richard tries to make a case for the existence of memes. I won't go back to Richard's argument, which might indeed be worth criticising, I will instead concentrate only on Dan's argument which can be analysed on its own.

Dan starts by giving a definition of a copy. This is a smart move and I believe myself it is important to define this concept very clearly. I have made an attempt to do so in my own theoretical work, and I will explain later how Dan's definition is good but, in my opinion, incomplete. Here is Dan's definition:

Let me […] define three minimal conditions for true replication. For B to be a replication of A,
  1. B must be caused by A (together with background conditions),
  2. B must be similar in relevant respects to A, and
  3. The process that generates B must obtain the information that makes B similar to A from A.

In a thought experiment, Dan explains that when people copy a random drawing from memory, they perform very badly but when they copy from memory a recognisable shape such as a five-branched star they perform very well. Dan explains that if they perform so well it is not because they copy the star but because they create a new drawing from what they recognised as a well known star.
Therefore Dan claims that, in this case, the condition (3) of his definition is not satisfied, in other words that the new drawing of a star was not a direct copying resulting from the details of the first star, but rather a simple reproduction of the star that was already known before the test.

I have two simple objections to that point.

First, even if the copy is not a copy of the original star from the test, there is nevertheless a copy being made of the very first star that we learned about, long before the test. There had to be a first initial exposure to the star in the past so that the star could then be reproduced again in that future test. This suggests that even if the copying process that Dan is criticising is indeed not a real copying process, there might still be an underlying copying process going on, on a larger time scale. So if one looks at the test on a larger scale, we might realise that condition (3) is indeed satisfied, except for it's not the same object A that we should consider, A being that very first star we encountered.

Second, there is still something being copied in this particular test, and even so when copying a random drawing. People are not just copying the drawing, they are copying different aspects of the drawing. One of which, for example, is the fact that it's a line drawing, that the line is dark and that it is on a light coloured piece of flat material. All of those could be copied faithfully regardless of whether the drawing itself is resemblant or not, and probably, even if the person doing the copying never used a pen and paper before. So, in a way it is unfair to say that there is no copying going on here. These points should not be downplayed I believe, and again they would satisfy Dan's own definition.

Also, Dan ignores the inherent complexity of a random drawing. Computer scientists know too well that random data is the most difficult type of data to store because it is incompressible, in other words there are no rules that would allow to store it in a simple way. The same goes for our brains. Therefore when copying a random drawing one needs to remember a lot more than when copying a geometrical shape for example.
Another way of looking at it, is that a random shape would make a bad replicator indeed. Because it demands more effort to remember it. Therefore, it is little surprise that a random drawing will generate worse copies of itself than a nice regular five-branched star would.


3/
The last point is probably Dan's strongest argument against memetics.

The argument is quite simple and goes more or less like this. When a child learns how to speak she naturally learns the grammar, although nobody has actually explicitly taught her the rules of grammar. That is because the rules of grammar have to be inferred from the context by the child, thanks to her genetic propensity to do so.
Therefore, Dan rightly suggests that grammar, and probably most of our culture, is not learned through a copying process but through inference, which, if it were true, would undermine seriously the very idea of memes.

The ironic situation here is that Dan himself offers a solution to his own question, and we don't need to look further than his own definition of replication. Here is how it goes :

Grammar rule B is a replication of grammar rule A because :
  1. Grammar rule B is caused by grammar rule A (together with background conditions),
  2. Grammar rule B is similar in relevant respects to grammar rule A, and
  3. The process that generates grammar rule B, obtains the information that makes grammar rule B similar to grammar rule A from grammar rule A.

But, if anything, this only shows that Dan is not quite consistent with his own ideas. This doesn't say whether his definition of replication is good and whether this counter-argument is valid.

To answer this question we simply need to go back to the original definition of the replicator and ask the question. Is there such an entity as a grammar rule A that is being successfully and sustainably replicated throughout a population? I believe we can confidently answer yes, and that's all it takes for grammar rule A to fit the definition of replicator. Thus the cultural nature of grammar rule A would make it a cultural replicator, i.e. a meme.

From the meme's eye view, it is irrelevant whether there is a genetic propensity for grammar rules to exist or not, it's only the result that counts, i.e. whether it is replicated or not. But, it is relevant from a memetic evolutionary point of view in order to try and understand what will determine which of all grammar rules will be most successful. A genetic propensity for learning grammar rules is indeed a catalyst for those types of memes.

My overall impression of the objection by Dan Sperber, is that Dan has perhaps not understood every detail of Dawkins' idea. As a result, Dan tries to criticize a false idea of memetics. This is unfortunate given the quality of Dan Sperber's analytical mind.

This is the reason why I always try to show how important it is to understand the idea of the replicator and being able to take a meme's eye view on culture. It is not really Richard's work that I try to defend here but the replicator idea itself. It is an extremely powerful idea that has been remarkably conveyed and developed by Richard Dawkins but I also hold my own opinion on some aspects of memetics and I think there is much to be done still.
I have myself suggested a definition of what a copy is, and also what a replicator and a meme are. I believe we can be more precise in those definitions so as to leave less room to ambiguity and hopefully use it to build a stronger model of memetics. I invite you to read my definitions in my online theoretical attempt:


Comments are very welcome.

10 October 2010

Comments on “The evolution of the meme” by Kevin Laland and John Odling-Smee

I would like to try my hands at commenting some of the articles gathered inside the following book: 



Darwinizing Culture.
The status of memetics as a science.
Edited by Robert Aunger.
Foreword by Daniel Dennett.
With contributions from:
Robert Aunger, Susan Blackmore, Maurice Bloch, Robert Boyd, Rosaria Conte, David L.Hull, Adam Kuper, Kevin Laland, John Odling-Smee, Henry Plotkin, Peter J. Richerson, Dan Sperber.

I will start with the article entitled “The evolution of the meme” by Kevin Laland and John Odling-Smee.

I want to show that Kevin Laland and John Odling-Smee misunderstand the concept of meme and, more precisely, the concept of replicator altogether, which as a result discredits somewhat the point they are trying to make in their article.

K. Laland and J. Odling-Smee introduce a concept of niche construction which is very interesting in itself, and apply it to the meme idea to try and understand how memes came about. The niche construction can be seen as a transformation of the environment by the living organisms which in turn changes the selective pressure on those same organisms and their descendants. K. Laland and J. Odling-Smee make some very valid points here, but strangely seem to miss completely the point of Dawkins' memes. They write :

What determines whether a meme will spread? For Dawkins (1976), memes, like all replicators, spread if they have fidelity, fecundity and longevity. In memetic discussions, each of these properties is usually treated as if it is an intrinsic characteristic of the meme.

K. Laland and J. Odling-Smee seem to criticise the fact that those characteristics are “intrinsic”. This is where they are mistaken because indeed these characteristics are very much intrinsic. They are so simply because it is their definition. It is not that some memes might have them and others might not, it is that anything that has those characteristics is a replicator and those that don't simply don't qualify as replicators. This unfortunate misunderstanding leads to confusion, for example, when they write:

[...] studies of social learning in species as diverse as rats, pigeons and guppies suggest that these animals sometimes adopt a “do-what-the-majority-do” strategy (Laland et al. 1996B). In such cases, the probability that an individual will adopt a meme depends not on its infectiousness, but on the number of individuals already expressing the behaviour.

Again, if a meme, or any replicator, fails to be copied it is precisely because it has lost its infectiousness, and it has lost it because the environment has changed, suddenly turning what previously was a successful replicator, into a non replicator. This is maybe the point that K. Laland and J. Odling-Smee have missed. It is the relationship between the environment and the replicator that defines a replicator. If the environment changes the very nature of the replicators is to be re-examined. 

This issue obviously casts a shadow on their overall argument of niche construction which otherwise is full of interesting insights on evolutionary processes and most certainly worth a read.